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SCOPING AND DEFINING FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION, ACCESS TO CREDIT, AND 
SUSTAINABLE FINANCE 




This is a symposium about using commercial law and financial regulation to 
improve lives. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how economic inequality 
strains our financial and political systems. Distinguished contributors to this 
symposium agree that law and financial regulation can help combat inequality 
and provide new economic opportunities for disadvantaged demographics. 
Often, legal and regulatory proposals to achieve these goals invoke the terms 
“financial inclusion,” “access to credit,” and “sustainable finance,” as does this 
symposium’s title. 
However, these ubiquitous terms remain poorly defined. For example, the 
World Bank’s definition of financial inclusion encompasses both access to credit 
and sustainable finance.1 Other definitions of financial inclusion are circular2 or 
conclusory.3 Similarly, writers on sustainable finance conflate it with the 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) movement in corporate law.4 
 
Copyright © 2021 by Steven L. Schwarcz & Theodore L. Leonhardt. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
* Stanley A. Star Distinguished Professor of Law and Business at Duke University and Senior Fellow at 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation. 
** Duke Law Graduate ‘20, Magna Cum Laude, and Executive Editor of the Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law. 
 1.  Financial Inclusion, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/ 
overview [https://perma.cc/GG99-83T3] (Oct. 2, 2018) (defining “financial inclusion” as meaning that 
“individuals and businesses have access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet 
their needs – transactions, payments, savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and 
sustainable way”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Erin F. Fonté, Mobile Payments in the United States: How Disintermediation May Affect 
Delivery of Payment Functions, Financial Inclusion and anti-Money Laundering Issues, 8 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 419, 450 (2013) (quoting MARIANNE CROW ET AL., THE U.S. REGULATORY 
LANDSCAPE FOR MOBILE PAYMENTS 8 (2012))(“The goal of financial inclusion is to help low and 
moderate income (LMI) and underserved consumers enter the financial mainstream.”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Amanda Bloch Kernan, Sustaining the Growth of Mobile Money Services in Developing 
Nations: Lessons from Overregulation in the United States, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1109, 1116 (2018) 
(describing “financial inclusion” generally as an “essential facet of economic development”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Thomas Clarke & Martijn Boersma, Sustainable Finance? A Critical Analysis of the 
Regulation, Policies, Strategies, Implementation and Reporting on Sustainability in International Finance 
4–5 (U.N. Env’t Programme, Working Paper 16/03, 2016) (using the term “sustainable finance” to discuss 
a variety of environmental, social, and governance aspirations). 
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International institutions view these terms as describing components of larger 
targets, such as the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals,5 rather than 
independent goals for the existing financial system. Without articulating a clear 
sense of purpose for the financial system, this opaque terminology will threaten 
to replicate business jargon’s “sheer weight of euphemism, grammatical infelicity, 
disingenuity and downright ugliness.”6 
Because these terms purport to describe how the financial system should be 
fundamentally changed, they should be well defined in a manner that is informed 
by an understanding of the financial system’s functions. The United Kingdom’s 
Independent Commission on Banking, chaired by Sir John Vickers, identifies 
“three broad functions: to facilitate payments; to intermediate funds between 
savers and borrowers; and to help manage financial risks.”7 Those functions 
should underpin the meanings of financial inclusion, access to credit, and 
sustainable finance, respectively. 
From that functional perspective, this Article scopes and defines financial 
inclusion, access to credit, and sustainable finance to clarify and organize this 
muddled vocabulary into a clear and pragmatic taxonomy8 that lawyers and 
policymakers can use to express regulatory goals.9 Within a taxonomy, each 
concept’s “normative definition should strive to achieve an optimal regulatory or 
other clarifying purpose, otherwise the definition is merely an academic 
exercise.”10 Setting the breadth and boundaries for these buzzwords can 
 
 5.  See, e.g., UN GLOB. COMPACT, SCALING FINANCE FOR THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 3 (2019), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/5721 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2XAS-
EG6N] (proposing a “conceptual framework” for sustainable finance to meet the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals in accord with the UN Global Compact’s human rights, labor, environmental, and 
anti-corruption principles). 
 6.  Lucy Kellaway, Lucy Kellaway’s Jargon Awards: Corporate Guff Scales New Heights, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d118ce7a-d325-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51 [https:// 
perma.cc/FQ42-NM4L]. In her journalistic campaign against executives parroting meaningless mission 
statements, Kellaway reserved rare praise for executives who clearly expressed their corporate aims, such 
as a Chinese meatpacker who proclaimed, “What I do is kill pigs and sell meat,” and a railroad executive 
who explained, “We move stuff from one place to another.” 
 7.  INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 270 (2011) [hereinafter 
VICKERS REPORT]. 
 8.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “taxonomy” as, in part, “[a] classification of something; 
a particular system of classification.” Taxonomy (n.), OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2013), 
https://www-oed-com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/198305?redirectedFrom=taxonomy#eid [https:// 
perma.cc/R65J-WV27]. This systematic conception of taxonomy owes its modern origins to the Swedish 
naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707–78), whose binomial nomenclature for identifying organisms by genus and 
species persists to the present. See generally Staffan Müller-Wille, Carolus Linnaeus, ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA (Jan. 6, 2020). 
 9.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1283, 1294 (2012) (describing the “need [for] definitional clarity in order to know how to apply and 
enforce the law”). Cf. Deborah Burand & Anne Tucker, Legal Literature Review of Social 
Entrepreneurship and Impact Investing (2007-2017): Doing Good by Doing Business, 11 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2019) (describing how the “lack of agreed terminology muddles and impedes growth 
within [the] body of academic literature” on impact investing). 
 10.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1289–90. 
01_SCHWARCZ & LEONHARDT _SCOPING AND DEFINING (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2021  12:34 PM 
No. 1 2021] SCOPING AND DEFINING 3 
transform mere monikers into useful terms that are “rooted pragmatically, taking 
into account how, functionally, the concept is used in the real world.”11 
For each term, we follow a sequential methodology of scoping and defining. 
Scoping means setting a concept’s boundaries.12 An appropriate conceptual scope 
is neither too broad nor too narrow.13 Overly broad definitions are problematic 
because they may cause uncertainty about the applicability of a concept or law to 
a given party.14 Conversely, overly narrow definitions may truncate important 
normative and regulatory debates.15 The “confusion and misunderstanding 
created by an exclusionary or underinclusive definition” can also cause 
inadequate regulatory responses to market changes.16 When markets change, 
narrow definitions quickly become obsolete.17 
After scoping, we define each term based on three criteria. First, each 
definition must be accurate—it should “reasonably identif[y] what is 
described.”18 Accuracy is important, because “[u]nclear definitions can lead to 
hard-fought court battles over seemingly minor semantic issues.”19 Second, “the 
definition ideally should be consistent with market expectations . . . .”20 This 
principle channels legal realism, as exemplified by Karl Llewellyn’s functional 
development of the Uniform Commercial Code,21 which expressly incorporates 
the market’s “course of performance,” “course of dealing,” and “usage of 
trade.”22 Consistency with market expectations means that a taxonomy is 
accessible to academics and practitioners—including lawyers, legislators, 
regulators, and policymakers—as well as consumers. After all, “[d]efinitions 
provide value to the extent they enable audience members to focus on 
 
 11.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 73 (2013). 
 12.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “scope,” in part, as “[t]o calculate the scope or range 
of.” Scope (v.2), OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), https://www-oed-
com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/172977?rskey=SxY73F&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid [https:// 
perma.cc/75HX-UWNR]. 
 13.  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1289–92 (discussing the risks of both overly broad and 
exclusionary definitions of securitization). 
 14.  Id. at 1292. 
 15.  Cf. id. at 1289 (proposing that a definition of “securitization” should include securitization’s 
weaknesses to promote debates and invite regulation). 
 16.  Id. at 1297 n.19, 1291. 
 17.  See id. at 1295 (“[T]he greater its precision, the less likely a definition will continue over time to 
describe a financial concept.”). 
 18.  U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 19.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1294 (citing Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 
26, 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968) (interpreting U.C.C. § 9-108(a))). 
 20.  Id. at 1292. 
 21.  Id. at 1288–89. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to Address Changing Markets: A 
Consequence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017, at 163, 177 (citing KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011)). 
 22.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (“A course of performance or course of dealing between the parties 
or usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be 
aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give particular meaning to 
the specific terms of the agreement, and may supplement and qualify the terms of the agreement.”). 
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characteristics relevant to them.”23 Finally, “[a]ny definition . . . should strive to 
minimize definitional obsolescence.”24 As Llewellyn recognized, conceptual 
definitions and markets must evolve together.25 
By this methodology, we propose defining financial inclusion, access to credit, 
and sustainable finance as follows. Financial inclusion means broad-based 
deposit-account ownership and access to payments services.26 Access to credit 
means access to loan funding on reasonable terms, especially for underserved 
demographics of potential entrepreneurs.27 Sustainable finance describes a 
system that continuously provides financial inclusion and access to credit.28 These 
definitions correspond to the Vickers Report’s “broad functions” of facilitating 
payments, intermediating funds, and managing financial risks.29 
After scoping and defining each of these terms in Parts II through IV of this 
Article, we use our taxonomy in Part V to discuss possible policy proposals for 
addressing economic dislocations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.30 
Immediately, we hope that our taxonomy can offer an analytical lens for reading 
the contributions to this symposium, which we will reference throughout this 
Article. More ambitiously, we hope that our taxonomy can provide a common 
set of terms for rigorous debates on how commercial law and financial regulation 
can contribute to alleviating economic inequality, political instability, and 
fragility in the financial system. 
II 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Current definitions of financial inclusion are overly broad. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) inconclusively surveyed definitions of financial inclusion, 
only to settle for the vague and verbose proposition that “financial inclusion is a 
multifaceted concept, encompassing various dimensions, including access to and 
use of financial services as well as other aspects such as affordability, usefulness, 
quality, and awareness of financial services and products.”31 Another 
 
 23.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1291. 
 24.  Id. at 1297. 
 25.  Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF 
CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 133–34 (2019) (“Static laws that fail to 
reflect preferences of social norms, or do not respond to a changing environment, remain black letters 
on the books with little impact on social ordering.”). 
 26.  See infra text accompanying notes 31–56. 
 27.  See infra text accompanying notes 57–87. 
 28.  See infra text accompanying notes 88–128. 
 29.  See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 30.  Particularly, we draw on Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s concept of “antifragility” as the “antidote” to 
unexpected yet highly-damaging “black swan” events like the pandemic. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, 
ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 6–7, 20 (2012) (proposing a “spectrum” of 
fragility, resilience, and antifragility to describe, respectively, systems’ negative, neutral, or positive 
reactions to volatility). 
 31.  MARCO ESPINOSA-VEGA ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, MEASURING FINANCIAL ACCESS: 
10 YEARS OF THE IMF FINANCIAL ACCESS SURVEY 3 (2020). 
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policymaker, speaking at the founding of the Cato Institute’s Initiative for 
Financial Inclusion, emphasized the availability of choices among financial 
products.32 While that definition of financial inclusion advances free-market 
aspirations, it ignores the millions who lack even basic bank accounts33 and is 
insufficiently concrete for a legal and financial taxonomy.34 As discussed, other 
definitions are conclusory and circular,35 sometimes altogether omitting any 
explanatory meaning for financial inclusion.36 We believe the scope of this term 
should be narrower and more precise, focusing on access to essential banking 
services. 
To that end, we define financial inclusion as expanding account ownership to 
provide basic banking services,37 namely, deposit accounts and funds transfers. 
This definition is accurate: it “reasonably identifies” the problem of inadequate 
account ownership that global institutions and governments have described and 
measured.38 Despite decades of progress, the World Bank reports that nearly 
one-third of adults worldwide still lack a deposit account.39 Likewise, the U.S. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reports that, in 2017, 6.5% of 
American households were “unbanked.”40 
Our focus on account ownership is “consistent with market expectations.”41 
Market realities show that financial inclusion is simple: “Foremost, poor people 
want a safe space to store their money.”42 They also want an easy day-to-day 
means to use their money to make payments, such as paying rent or buying 
groceries. In considering “where customers are dependent on a service to meet 
their day-to-day need for money,” Britain’s Independent Commission on 
Banking concluded that “the key services are . . . deposits and overdrafts.”43 Like 
 
 32.  Brian Johnson, Consumer Protection and Financial Inclusion, 39 CATO J. 489, 490 (2019) 
(“[F]inancial inclusion is ‘the availability and equality of opportunities to access financial 
services’ . . . [which] implies the absence of conditions that impede the ability of consumers to 
make . . . choices.”). 
 33.  See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining “taxonomy”). 
 35.  See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 36.  See Eleanor Lumsden, The Future Is Mobile: Financial Inclusion and Technological Innovation 
in the Emerging World, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4 (2018) (calling for technological solutions to 
promote “financial inclusion” without defining the term). 
 37.  See VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 (describing “basic banking services”). 
 38.  Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing U.C.C. § 9-108(a)’s requirement for a 
description of collateral that “reasonably identifies what is described”). 
 39.  A. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, LEORA KLAPPER, DOROTHE SINGER, SANIYA ANSAR & JAKE HESS, 
WORLD BANK GRP., THE GLOBAL FINDEX DATABASE 2017: MEASURING FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND 
THE FINTECH REVOLUTION 3, 35 (2017), https://globalfindex. worldbank.org/ [https://perma.cc/43MB-
LBWD] [hereinafter FINDEX DATABASE] (“Globally, about 1.7 billion adults remain unbanked”). 
 40.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1–2 (2017), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3WR-MGWW] [hereinafter 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY] (defining unbanked as 
lacking a federally-insured bank account). 
 41.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 42.  Anita Bernstein, The Trouble with Regulating Microfinance, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013). 
 43.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 36–37. 
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electric power or running water,44 account owners expect these services to be 
available when they “flip the switch.”45 
Expectations for ubiquitous, secure, and stable depository and payments 
services date back centuries. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith identified 
the public interest in banking and compared banks to public utilities.46 For this 
symposium, Professor Federico Lupo-Pasini shows that debates about banking 
as a public good have continued from Smith’s time to the present.47 Account 
ownership forms a basis for those debates, because payments systems and lending 
often depend upon ownership of a bank account.48 
The long history of viewing account ownership as a public good ensures that 
our basic banking definition of financial inclusion will not become obsolete.49 
Echoing Lupo-Pasini, Professor TT Arvind shows in his article that the historical 
perspective on financial inclusion and sustainability remains apposite for 
improving the financial system, especially during crises.50 Depository and 
payment services are not new, but technology has promoted financial inclusion 
by improving the means of delivering these services. Already, “mobile money” 
technology, which allows “users to store and transfer funds through a mobile 
phone,” has reduced the costs of operating and using payments networks.51 For 
instance, mobile phone technology has expanded access to financial services in 
places like sub-Saharan Africa.52 
Our definition also encourages debate on the costs and benefits of new 
technology for basic banking services.53 Professor Iris Chiu shows in her article 
that cryptocurrencies and other distributed ledger technologies could enhance 
financial inclusion, but also risk replicating the current system’s financialization.54 
Likewise, Professor Emily Lee exposes how technology creates a tension 
between financial inclusion and financial consumerism through her study of 
Hong Kong-licensed virtual banks.55 To avoid obsolescence, our definition of 
 
 44.  See infra text accompanying note 99. 
 45.  Cf. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 11 (describing consumers’ lack of alternatives for deposit 
and payments systems). 
 46.  Sankar Muthu, Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing 
“Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment, 36 POL. THEORY 185, 195 (2008). 
 47. See generally Federico Lupo-Passini, Financial Inclusion and the “War for Cash”, 84 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 17. 
 48.  Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 87 n.127. 
 49.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 50.  See generally TT Arvind, Too Big to Care?: Financial Contracts and the Problem of Transactional 
Asymmetry, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 35. 
 51.  FINDEX DATABASE, supra note 39, at 1, 12. 
 52.  Id. at 11. 
 53.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing how a taxonomy should engender debate 
on regulatory concepts’ strengths and weaknesses). 
 54.  See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulating Sustainable Finance in Capital Markets: A Perspective 
from Socially Embedded Decentralized Regulation, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 75. 
 55.  See generally, Emily Lee, Digital Financial Inclusion: Observations and Insights from Hong 
Kong’s Virtual Banks, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 93. 
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financial inclusion encapsulates both improving technologies and the historical 
public interest in deposit-account ownership.56 
III 
ACCESS TO CREDIT 
The scope of access to credit has also been unclear and, often, too expansive. 
As discussed, the World Bank has defined access to credit as a component of 
financial inclusion.57 Functionally, these terms are related: “The core functions of 
banks—taking deposits and making loans—are to some extent complementary, 
in that they are produced more efficiently together than separately.”58 However, 
the Vickers Report distinguishes access to credit from the deposit services that 
we identify with financial inclusion. Consumers worldwide must have immediate 
access to deposits for living expenses.59 Unlike deposits, “credit supply should be 
stable and resilient to shocks but it need not all be continuously provided.”60 For 
example, most U.S. consumer debt arises from episodic life events, such as buying 
a home or attending college.61 
This reliance on borrowed funds raises normative questions about the scope 
of access to credit.62 Who should have access to credit? In what amounts? For 
what purposes? Discussing student loans in her contribution to this symposium, 
Professor Victoria Haneman considers how to provide the critical social good of 
education by sustainably managing student debt as a “common pool resource” in 
order to avoid the exhaustion of that resource from a tragedy of the commons.63 
Adapting her emphasis on equal opportunity and intergenerational 
sustainability,64 we especially focus our definition of access to credit on funding 
entrepreneurs from underserved groups, who can create jobs and lift 
communities from poverty. 
 
 56.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to Address Changing Markets: A Consequence-Based 
Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2017, at 163, 163 (discussing “when the law should ‘follow’ 
changes in financial markets”). 
 57.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 1 (including access to credit in its “financial inclusion” definition). 
 58.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 271. 
 59.  See id. at 36–37. See also FINDEX DATABASE, supra note 39, at 10 (describing how citizens in 
both high-income countries and the developing world rely on their own savings or the savings of friends 
and family during emergencies). 
 60.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 37. 
 61.  See Harriet Torry, Mortgage Debt Hits Record, Eclipsing 2008 Peak, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2019, 
at A3 (describing mortgage loans as accounting for the greatest share of U.S. household debt, despite 
auto loans’ increasing share). 
 62.  Compare Marco Meyer, The Right to Credit, 26 J. POL. PHIL. 304, 306 (2018) (proposing a “right 
to credit” to address the problem that “[l]ack of access to credit can prevent individuals from starting 
businesses, going to university, or buying homes”), with Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social 
Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1157 (2019) (“[C]redit as social provision is not a substitute for a robust 
welfare regime that addresses the broader structural forces that result in entrenched, intractable 
poverty.”). 
 63.  Victoria J. Haneman, (Re)Framing Student Loan Debt as a Commons, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 153. 
 64.  Id. 
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Yet expanding access to credit presents a classic chicken-and-egg problem. 
The poor lack assets because they cannot access credit, but cannot access credit 
because they lack assets to pledge as collateral.65 Mortgage finance is especially 
inadequate in the developing world and disadvantaged communities,66 as 
nonexistent or confusing titles to real property hinder would-be entrepreneurs 
who cannot obtain collateralized credit from their homes.67 Inadequate mortgage 
finance is problematic because, as Professor John Linarelli observes in his 
contribution to this symposium, government-subsidized mortgage loans have 
long been a primary means of encouraging social mobility and intergenerational 
wealth creation in the United States.68 Professor Linarelli contends that 
regulations have too often oscillated between promoting access to credit and 
protecting the system from excessive leverage, without due regard for principles 
of equality.69 
Conflicting mortgage finance policies demonstrate the conundrum of scoping 
the appropriate amount of credit: leverage can enhance growth, but excessive 
debt can endanger both the financial system and political stability.70 Indeed, “[i]t 
has been known for centuries that more leverage leads to more risk.”71 
Accordingly, the scope of access to credit should focus on simple lending; access 
to credit need not mean access to highly-complex and highly-leveraged 
instruments. As the first author of this Article has explained, “[t]he key is that 
the loans be sufficiently overcollateralized—that their collateral value exceed the 
amount of the loan by a reasonable margin, enabling repayment in the event of a 
default.”72 Overcollateralization is especially important for consumer lending, 
because certain disadvantaged borrowers may have nothing to lose by 
 
 65.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into Collateralized 
Credit, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23 (2019) (explaining that prudent bank lending traditionally 
required “two ways out” for repayment: collateral and cash flows). 
 66.  See FINDEX DATABASE, supra note 39, at 9. According to the World Bank, “27 percent of adults 
in high income economies reported having an outstanding housing loan from a bank or another type of 
financial institution . . . [but] that share was typically less than 10 percent in developing economies.” Id. 
 67.  Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 2–3 (citing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 18–
22 (2000)). 
 68.  John Linarelli, Equality and Access to Credit: A Social Contract Framework, 84 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 165. 
 69.  Id. at 177–80. 
 70.  See PISTOR, supra note 25, at 78 (describing how debt causes “expansion from one 
unprecedented height to another— to be followed only too often by equally steep downturns, safe only 
for the successful intervention of states”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 568 (2009) (“High leverage fosters systemic risk and hence 
externalities by making it more likely that a firm will fail, thereby triggering failures of other highly-
leveraged counterparty firms.”). 
 71.  John Geanakoplos, Leverage Caused the 2007-2009 Crisis, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 236 (Douglas Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, 
Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz, eds., Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019). 
 72.  Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 23. 
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defaulting.73 Loans with conservative loan-to-value ratios can still enhance credit 
access while reducing the amount of leverage and risk.74 Defining access to credit 
based on simple, overcollateralized lending may also expand borrowing by 
helping lenders overcome their fear of international secured lending to small and 
medium-sized businesses, which Professor N. Orkun Akseli details in his 
contribution.75 Professor Linarelli adds that a Rawlsian approach, predicated 
upon equal opportunity, can inform mortgage lending policies that provide the 
social good of housing without excessive leverage and financial engineering.76 
From that scope, we define access to credit as follows: to make prudent 
lending available to all, including heretofore underserved borrowers, for 
beneficial purposes like starting a business. By our criteria, this definition is 
accurate because it addresses would-be borrowers’ inability to obtain simple 
loans.77 It reflects market realities by distinguishing access to credit from financial 
inclusion, because account ownership alone does not guarantee access to credit.78 
Our emphasis on prudent lending also incorporates the market’s lessons about 
excessive leverage from the 2008 financial crisis.79 Finally, prudent secured 
lending is timeless, so this definition will not become obsolete.80 
IV 
SUSTAINABLE FINANCE 
Prior definitions of sustainable finance are also overly broad. They conflate 
sustainable finance and the “environmental, social and governance (ESG)” 
movement in corporate law.81 Corporations often oppose ESG proposals from 
 
 73.  See Geanakoplos, supra note 71, at 250 (“Subprime borrowers have low ratings, and so the credit 
score loss of defaulting is not as high.”). Cf. Bob Dylan, Like a Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited 
(Columbia Records 1965) (“When you [ain’t] got nothing, you got nothing to lose”). 
 74.  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 25 (“The prudent lending standard thus will restrict the relative 
amount an economically disadvantaged person could borrow against his de facto rights. Nonetheless, that 
amount may well be sufficient to start a viable small business.”). 
 75.  N. Orkun Akseli, Financial Inclusion, Access to Credit, and Sustainable Finance: What role for 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions?, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 181. 
 76.  See Linarelli, supra note 68, at 177–80. 
 77.  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 78.  Currently, many so-called “underbanked” Americans with federally-insured bank accounts rely 
on nonbank lenders for highly expensive payday loans, title loans, and other credit products. 2017 FDIC 
NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 40, at 39. In developing economies, consumers and businesses continue 
to depend on their friends and families for credit, even as account ownership expands. FINDEX 
DATABASE, supra note 39, at 9. 
 79.  Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 24 (describing how subprime mortgage loans were not sufficiently 
overcollateralized before the 2008 crisis). 
 80.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 
DUKE L.J. 425, 428 (1997) (citing Deuteronomy 24:10–13) (relating the story of a poor man pledging his 
cloak as security for a loan). 
 81.  See Clarke and Boersma, supra note 4 (describing definitions of “sustainable finance” that 
discuss financial, social, and environmental aims); see also Martin Lipton, William Savitt & Karessa L. 
Cain, On the Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/27/on-the-purpose-of-the-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/S8FW-
RJN4] (describing the “view that corporations should take into account environmental, social and 
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shareholders, viewing the proposals as distracting impositions on directors’ 
business judgment.82 Muddling sustainable finance and ESG may risk politicizing 
proposals for a broad-based financial system. A more logical way to define this 
term’s scope should start with its noun, finance, and then examine the meaning 
of its adjective. 
Given that scope, what should it mean for finance to be sustainable? 
Sustainability means “meeting our own needs without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.”83 Sustainable finance thus should 
mean finance that meets existing needs without compromising the ability to meet 
future needs. The other two terms on which this article focuses—financial 
inclusion and access to credit—describe finance that meets human needs. 
Accordingly, sustainable finance should mean the ability to provide financial 
inclusion and access to credit, today and in the future.84 
This definition is consistent with market expectations. The Vickers Report, 
for example, calls for a resilient financial system that continuously safeguards 
deposits and provides payments services.85 It regards the continuous provision of 
these financial services as “critical to the economy.”86 This definition also should 
prove durable because financial inclusion and access to credit are concerned with 
the fundamental needs for protecting, transferring, and lending money.87 
V 
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND AN ANTIFRAGILE REGULATORY APPROACH 
The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing social distancing policies have caused 
economic dislocations and hardship globally. In the United States, the 
unemployment rate reached 14.7% in April 2020, with 20.5 million Americans 
 
governance (ESG) issues in running their businesses, and resistance from those who believe that 
companies should be managed solely to maximize share price”). 
 82.  Patrick Temple-West, Record Year for Environmental, Social Investor Petitions, FIN. TIMES 
(June 9, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6dceb82a-1084-40bf-91cb-7cb6100f3992 [https://perma.cc/ 
7SBJ-UU4L]. 
 83.  MCGILL UNIV. & UNIV. OF ALTA., WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY?, https://www.mcgill.ca/ 
sustainability/files/sustainability/what-is-sustainability.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6WN-58GN]. Cf. REPORT 
OF THE UN WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 41 (2000), https://sustainable 
development.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G5P-QC7J] 
(similarly defining sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”). 
 84.  In that sense, the term implicitly takes into account systemic risk, which can threaten these 
continuous financial services. Cf. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 76 (“Problems are liable to spread 
quickly from one part of the financial system to another and the authorities face the unacceptable choice 
between supporting bank creditors or allowing vital services to the economy to be interrupted.”); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Conclusion: Closing Perspectives on Regulating Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE 
FIN. SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT CRASH 263 (Douglas Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny 
Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz, eds., Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019) (suggesting a 
more systematic framework of macroprudential regulation to protect financial stability). 
 85.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
 86.  Id. at 36. 
 87.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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losing jobs.88 The pandemic ended the longest bull market in American history.89 
In this Part, we use our taxonomy to discuss possible policy proposals for the 
financial system’s recovery from the pandemic. 
The pandemic may be described as a “black swan” occurrence, defined by the 
author Nassim Nicholas Taleb as “a very low-probability but very high-risk 
event.”90 Despite black swan events like the pandemic, sustainable finance (as we 
define it) requires continuously providing financial inclusion and access to credit, 
which encompass widespread access to such basic banking services as deposit-
account ownership, payments services, and adequate loan funding on reasonable 
terms. To protect these services—especially if black swan events are becoming 
more common91—a sustainable financial system might need to “ring-fence” 
vulnerable deposit-taking institutions from the commercial calamities that 
complexity can cause.92 “Ring-fencing” means “legally deconstructing a 
firm . . . to reallocate and reduce risk more optimally, such as by protecting the 
firm’s assets and operations and minimizing its internal and affiliate risks.”93 
Historically, the 1933 Glass-Steagall legislation separated American commercial 
and investment banks.94 After the 2008 crisis, Sir John Vickers and others 
reinvigorated ring-fencing,95 and as Professor A Karim Aldhoni details for this 
symposium, the United Kingdom extensively implemented the Vickers Report’s 
proposals.96 
Ring-fencing is consistent with the Vickers Report’s view of the financial 
system’s functions. That Report envisioned “a banking system that is effective 
and efficient at providing the basic banking services of safeguarding retail 
deposits, operating secure payments systems, efficiently channeling savings to 
productive investments, and managing financial risk.”97 As such, it recommended 
 
 88.  Sarah Chaney and Eric Morath, April Unemployment Rate Rose to 14.7%; Unprecedented 20.5 
million jobs shed as coronavirus pandemic hit the economy, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2020, at A1. 
 89.  Jeanna Smialek, The U.S. Entered a Recession in February, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2020. 
 90.  Howell E. Jackson & Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Stability: Lessons from the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3644417 [https://perma.cc/FU9G-QMZG] (citing NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK 
SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2nd ed. 2010)). 
 91.  As the financial system is becoming more complex, the increasing frequency of failures would 
seem to follow from chaos theory’s concept of deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, “which recognizes 
that the more complex the system, the more likely it is that failures will occur.” Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 827 n.44 (2012). 
 92.  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 97 (proposing that ring-fencing can protect depositors). 
 93.  Id. at 82. 
 94.  Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 48 Stat. 162 §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32. See also VICKERS 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 36. 
 95.  See generally VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7 (establishing a commission in 2010 to assess 
recommendations for increasing structural financial stability in the U.K. banking sector, including ring-
fencing); see also Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 97 (supporting retail ring-fencing). 
 96.  A Karim Aldohni, The Accessibility of Credit and the Protection of Consumers in the High-Cost 
Credit Sector: A Multifaceted Challenge, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2021, at 197. See also 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33 (U.K.) (requiring that consumers’ deposits be held 
by ring-fenced entities). 
 97.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. 
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implementing “structural separation” by requiring the United Kingdom’s retail 
banks to operate as distinct, independently-governed legal entities.98 Like public 
utilities with a duty to serve,99 ring-fenced U.K. retail banks must provide certain 
“mandated services,” such as taking deposits, transferring payments, and offering 
overdrafts.100 They may not engage in potentially risky “prohibited services,” like 
investment banking or proprietary trading, which are “not integral to the 
provision of payments services to customers.”101 
The Vickers Report’s proffered rationale for ring-fencing matches our 
proposed definition of financial inclusion: 
The purpose of the retail ring-fence is to isolate those banking activities where 
continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s customers in 
order to ensure, first, that this provision is not threatened as a result of activities which 
are incidental to it and, second, that such provision can be maintained in the event of 
the bank’s failure without government solvency support.102 
This rationale addresses the financial fragility of consumers and banks, 
respectively. The Vickers Report found that most retail bank customers “are not 
well equipped to plan for [a depository or payment service] interruption,” like a 
disruption from a black swan event.103 Major reforms, like ring-fencing, can 
redesign banks to provide basic services through crises while reducing fragility by 
disabusing banks of their expectations for government bail-outs.104 
The pandemic also has demonstrated the importance of widespread deposit-
account ownership, which is part of our proposed definition of financial inclusion. 
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act provided 
direct economic impact payments to Americans earning up to $99,000 annually.105 
Yet low-income individuals often lack a bank account to receive a stimulus 
 
 98.  Id. at 9. 
 99.  See, e.g., Tripp v. Frank, 100 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1792) (identifying a ferry’s duty to serve a section 
of the River Humber). 
 100.  VICKERS REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 35. 
 103.  Id. at 38. 
 104.  See id. at 147 (“[A]n important objective of the reforms is to reduce the probability that the 
Government has to make [bail-out] investments again in the future.”). The Vickers Report observed that 
“[h]istorical evidence suggests that the costs of making investments to bail out banks are generally very 
large, but much smaller than the wider costs of financial crises.” Id. Nonetheless, the Report 
acknowledged the hidden costs of expected bail-outs. Id. at 76 (“An expectation of government bail-outs 
means the price of bank funding does not reflect the risks that banks run.”). Taleb and other 
commentators are more trenchant about the perceived moral hazard of bail-outs. See TALEB, supra note 
30, at 68 (“If nature ran the economy, it would not continuously bail out its living members to make them 
live forever.”); Lawrence H. White, Antifragile Banking and Monetary Systems, 33 CATO J. 471, 475 
(2013) (“A key challenge that faces us in developing an antifragile banking system is to find the best way 
to credibly tie the government to the mast to eliminate bailouts.”). 
 105.  Surekha Carpenter and Emily Wavering Corcoran, COVID-19 Financial Support: Who’s 
Covered and Who’s Not?, FED. RSRV. BANK OF RICHMOND (May 6, 2020), https://www.richmond 
fed.org/research/regional_economy/regional_matters/2020/rm_05_06_2020_covid19_financial_support 
[https://perma.cc/AB4N-SD8W]. 
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payment by direct deposit.106 The homeless cannot even receive checks by mail.107 
Although the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in theory, allows stimulus 
fund transfers to prepaid cards and prepaid bank accounts,108 the poor often incur 
high transaction costs in cashing stimulus checks or obtaining money orders.109 
Conceivably, broadening account ownership could encourage saving for shocks 
like the pandemic.110 Some commentators see the pandemic as an opportunity to 
implement low-cost banking through the U.S. Postal Service, which provided 
account services through the 1960s.111 Others argue that expanding bank 
chartering to ubiquitous corporations like supermarket chains could better 
broaden account ownership.112 These new entrants also could make the financial 
system more robust by introducing variability among business models.113 
Similarly, the pandemic has highlighted Americans’ financial fragility. One 
Federal Reserve study observes that nearly a majority of Americans lack $400 to 
pay for a surprise expense.114 Many Americans, and millions globally, require 
access to credit—which under our proposed definition includes adequate loan 
funding on reasonable terms—to pay for the pandemic’s unanticipated costs. Our 
definition also focuses on the importance of providing access to credit to aspiring 
entrepreneurs, especially those from underserved groups. Small businesses have 
struggled to obtain loans for continuing operations during social distancing 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Gillian Tett, Billy Nauman, Patrick Temple-West, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johson & Eileen 
Rodrigues, Coronavirus Profiteers Warned; Richard Curtis’s Plan to Build Back Better; The Rise of ‘S’ in 
ESG, FIN. TIMES: MORAL MONEY (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/457fc6d2-4f94-4a1f-bfb7-
4142a45480c4 [https://perma.cc/33FZ-TND2]. 
 110.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 111.  Tett, supra note 109 (citing Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 165 (Feb. 24, 2014), https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/02/its-time-for-postal-banking/#_ftn7 [https:// 
perma.cc/2UJ5-85NP]). 
 112.  Diego Zuluaga, To Help the Unbanked, Break the Industrial Bank Taboo, CATO AT LIBERTY 
(June 9, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/help-unbanked-break-industrial-bank-taboo [https://perma.cc/ 
C7S5-78JY]. 
 113.  Cf. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: 
Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 n.9 (2014) (“[F]inancial 
institutions operating under different regulatory regimes will be incentivized to follow different business 
strategies, which will reduce financial network interconnections and contagion . . . in the spirit 
of . . . Nassim Taleb’s advocacy of fostering ‘antifragile’ systems, which are as robust to catastrophic 
failure as possible because there is variability in their parts . . . .”). Imposing stakeholder governance on 
new entrants also could make the financial system more robust. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: 
Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21 (2016) (arguing for imposition 
of a public governance duty). 
 114.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017, 1–56, 2 (May 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-
report-economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY97-7V8P] (four in ten adults 
self-reported that, if faced with an unexpected expense of $400, they either would be unable, or else 
would have to borrow money or sell something, to pay it). 
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measures,115 with minority-owned businesses disproportionately impacted.116 
Credit unavailability may have caused the 2008 crisis,117 and insufficient access to 
credit could exacerbate the current downturn.118 
How can law and regulation expand access to credit to encourage an inclusive 
economic recovery from the pandemic? The first author of this Article proposes 
adapting reality-based commercial law concepts, such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s “holder in due course” doctrine and incorporation of “course 
of dealing,” to recognize and allow collateralization of the de facto rights of land 
occupants who lack legal title.119 The realities of commercial law should 
supersede formalistic property law to enable underserved groups, especially the 
poor, to pledge their de facto property rights as de jure collateral.120 The author 
shows how that could address inequality without unfairly impacting traditional 
property ownership.121 
Securitization can also help to generate funding to expand access to credit. 
Banks are unlikely to fill the funding gap for underserved demographics, because 
their business models rely on “marked-up interest rates,” just like retailers that 
purchase at wholesale and sell to consumers at higher prices.122 Securitization has 
the potential to generate funding and reduce borrowers’ cost of credit by 
accessing effectively endless capital market funds.123 Critics may be wary of 
securitizing loans to underserved borrowing demographics that might sometimes 
resemble pre-2008 subprime mortgage obligors.124 Nonetheless, basic asset-
 
 115.  Tiffany Hsu & Emily Flitter, Businesses Face a New Coronavirus Threat: Shrinking Access to 
Credit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/business/economy/coronavirus-
business-credit-access.html [https://perma.cc/X69Q-FRUA]. 
 116.  See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Coronavirus Pandemic Hits Minority-Owned Small 
Businesses Disproportionately Hard, New Poll Shows, (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.uschamber.com/press-
release/coronavirus-pandemic-hits-minority-owned-small-businesses-disproportionately-hard-new 
[https://perma.cc/DYR9-E7D6]. 
 117.  Steven L. Schwarcz, The Financial Crisis and Credit Unavailability: Cause or Effect, 72 BUS. 
LAW. 409, 411 (2017). 
 118.  Cf. Jackson & Schwarcz, supra note 90 (observing that whereas the widespread lack of adequate 
household emergency savings has traditionally been understood to represent a problem of consumer 
financial protection, the pandemic is revealing that it can also “pose systemic risks,” and that “many 
current interventions can be understood as serving to mitigate the consequences of limited financial 
resiliency at the household level”). 
 119.  Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 14. 
 120.  Id. at 29. 
 121.  Cf. PISTOR, supra note 25, at 229 (proposing “incrementalism” in democratic legal reforms). 
 122.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for Commercially 
Sustainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2011). 
 123.  Id. Typically, securitization entails an originator transferring rights to payment (often called 
“financial assets”) into a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”), which pays for the financial assets by issuing 
securities. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 
(1994). The SPV repays the capital market investors who own the securities as it receives payments on 
the underlying financial assets. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 1171. Professor Schwarcz has previously 
argued that securitization can allow microfinance lenders to draw cheaper and more abundant capital 
market funding while promoting access to credit for microfinance borrowers. Id. at 1169–70. 
 124.  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 24–25 (explaining why those subprime mortgage loans were 
risky). 
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backed securitization structures, like the collateralized debt obligation, could 
help expand access to credit while avoiding the high leverage and complexity that 
exacerbated the 2008 crisis.125 As in scoping access to credit, overcollateralization 
is critical for securitization.126 By providing two ways for a lender to recover,127 
overcollateralized lending offers the “[l]ayers of redundancy” that Taleb 
identifies as “the central risk management property of natural systems.”128 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have proposed a taxonomy to advance and clarify 
understanding of this symposium’s goals. To that end, we have explained why 
“financial inclusion” should encompass widespread deposit-account ownership 
and access to payments services. Further, “access to credit” should require 
adequate loan funding on reasonable terms, especially for aspiring entrepreneurs 
from underserved groups, and “sustainable finance” should mean continuously 
providing financial inclusion and access to credit. 
These are normative views about how these terms should be accurately 
defined. We recognize that actual usage sometimes is broader, reflecting a 
common trend of trying to combine private returns with public goods. We 
acknowledge, for example, that “sustainable finance” sometimes is used more 
broadly, to include using finance to try to achieve goals of the ESG movement.129 
Professor Chiu’s contribution focuses on investments and capital markets’ 
roles—including new EU legislation regarding those roles—in funding 
sustainable environmental outcomes, such as climate-change mitigation.130 
Because that broader usage describes using finance to help sustain non-financial 
public goods, perhaps it should be defined differently—such as financing public-
goods preservation. We hope that our taxonomy can provide a helpful starting 
point for those future definitional debates. 
 
 125.  See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 1176 (“[T]he best model for transformative securitization is the 
so-called collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction. Although CDO transactions have sometimes 
been demonized in the popular media, that results from a conflation of the time-tested and proved basic 
CDO structure . . . with highly leveraged and esoteric structures . . . .”). 
 126.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 127.  Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 23 (explaining that prudent bank lending traditionally requires 
“two ways out” for repayment: assets and cash flows). 
 128.  TALEB, supra note 30, at 44. 
 129.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 130.  See Chiu, supra note 54. 
